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Over the last few decades, Delaware courts have emphasized the
important role of independent directors in safeguarding the interests of
shareholders by preserving the integrity of the corporate governance process.
Delaware courts have focused on the independence of directors in
determining whether demand is excused in a derivative action and whenever
directors are required to exercise their judgment on behalf of the corporation
in a related-party transaction or other conflict situation.
Weinberger is a 1983 decision about a corporation, Signal, which was
the majority shareholder of a subsidiary, UOP. Signal eliminated UOP’s
minority shareholders by a cash-out merger. 1 In Weinberger, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that “when the directors of a Delaware corporation are
on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost
good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.” 2 In
footnote 7, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, “[a]lthough perfection is not
possible, or expected, the results here could have been entirely different if
UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside
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directors to deal with Signal at arm’s length.” 3
The takeover era of the 1980s gave rise to another contextual example
of the importance that Delaware courts assign to the role of independent
directors. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 4 the Delaware Supreme
Court held that when defensive measures are adopted the initial burden will
be on the directors to establish two things. First, the “directors must show
that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed.” 5 Directors “satisfy that burden ‘by
showing good faith and reasonable investigation.’” 6 Second, the directors
must show that the defensive mechanism was “reasonable in relation to the
threat posed.” 7 The Delaware Supreme Court explained that proof is
materially enhanced where a majority of the board favoring the proposal
consisted of outside independent directors. Since Unocal, in a myriad of
other contexts, Delaware courts have given significant weight and deference
to decisions made by directors who are found to be independent.
Director independence under Delaware law was explained by the
Delaware Supreme Court in the seminal case of Aronson v. Lewis as follows:
Independence means that a director’s decision is based on the
corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than
extraneous considerations or influences. While directors may
confer, debate, and resolve their differences through compromise,
or by reasonable reliance upon the expertise of their colleagues
and other qualified persons, the end result, nonetheless, must be
that each director has brought his or her own informed business
judgment to bear with specificity upon the corporate merits of the
issues without regard for or succumbing to influences which
convert an otherwise valid business decision into a faithless act. 8
Delaware law presumes that directors are independent. The burden is
on a challenging party to overcome that presumption. The independence of
a Delaware director is determined on an individual basis. In assessing
director independence, Delaware courts apply a subjective “actual person”
standard to determine whether a “given” director was likely to be affected in
the same or similar circumstances. 9

3. Id. at 709 n.7.
4. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
5. Id. at 955.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).
9. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 923 (Del 2000); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
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INDEPENDENCE DISTINGUISHED FROM INTEREST
It has frequently been noted that, although director interest and director
independence are both methods of challenging a director’s loyalty, the
difference between interest and independence is significant.10 A director is
interested in a given transaction if she stands to gain monetarily from it in a
way that other shareholders do not. 11
The Delaware General Corporation Law statute does not refer to
independent directors. 12 That statute addresses only the narrower concept of
“interested directors.” A director who is also a shareholder is interested in a
particular transaction if she stands to gain monetarily from it in a way that
other shareholders do not. 13 Financial self-dealing and material financial
self-interests eliminate director independence.
The difference between interest and independence is significant. The
characteristics of directorial independence are ascertained solely from
judicial opinions. The Delaware courts have developed the concept of
director independence to be more encompassing than mere financial interest.
In Delaware, the judicial independence inquiry requires an examination of
whether a director, although lacking in a financial self-interest, is somehow
connected to an interested party, or whether her decisions are not based on
the corporate merits, but rather are influenced by personal, business or any
other extraneous considerations. 14
In determining independence, Delaware courts broaden the inquiry into
the more subjective types of relationships that can generate what has been
called a sense of being “beholden” to an extraneous influence.15 In the
Martha Stewart derivative litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
independence is a fact-specific determination and that Delaware courts must
make that determination by answering two inquiries: “independent from
whom and independent for what purpose?” 16
Many of the seminal Delaware decisions involving director
independence were written by former Chief Justice Strine when he was on
10. Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675 (2009).
11. Aronson, 473 A.2d 805.
12. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 465
(2008) (“[I]t may be surprising to note that the Delaware General Corporation Law . . . does
not contain a single reference to independent directors.”).
13. Id.
14. Aronson, 473 A.2d 805.
15. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del.
2004).
16. Id. at 1050.
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the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery.
CHANCELLOR AND VICE CHANCELLOR STRINE
Biondi v. Scrushy was a derivative action involving the HealthSouth
Corporation scandals. 17 The HealthSouth board of directors’ special
litigation committee moved to dismiss the suit, which alleged that executives
sold shares of HealthSouth’s stock while they were in possession of material
non-public information and thereby injured the company. 18 The special
litigation committee initially consisted of two directors who were closely tied
to the CEO Richard M. Scrushy, the target of many of the allegations made
in the complaint. 19
HealthSouth Director Jon Hanson was the Chairman of the National
Football Foundation and College Hall of Fame, Inc. (“NFFCHF”) and
Director Larry D. Striplin was on NFFCHF’s board. 20 Scrushy was also on
the NFFCHF board. 21 HealthSouth had been an important donor to the
NFFCHF while Hanson was its chair. 22 In addition, Striplin and Scrushy had
longstanding personal ties to each other and to college football in Alabama,
where one college has a Scrushy-Striplin field. 23 The alleged independence
of the HealthSouth board’s special litigation committee did not survive
judicial scrutiny by Vice Chancellor Strine in light of the relationship the
committee members had with the insiders who allegedly engaged in
wrongdoing. 24
Later that same year, Vice Chancellor Strine declined to accept the
recommendation of a special litigation committee in the Oracle Corp.
derivative litigation. 25 In Oracle, Vice Chancellor Strine did not question
whether the members of the special litigation committee had acted in good
faith and diligently conducted their investigation. 26 He recognized that the
independence inquiry asks a different question. He summarized the
Delaware Supreme Court’s teachings on independence as follows: “At
bottom, the question of independence turns on whether a director is, for any
substantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interests
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 1156–57.
Id. at 1157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1166.
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Id.
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of the corporation in mind. That is, the Supreme Court cases ultimately focus
on impartiality and objectivity.” 27
In Oracle, Vice Chancellor Strine rejected the argument that the
emphasis of an independence inquiry should be on “domination and control”
because, in his view, such a focus would be “at the cost of denuding the
independence inquiry of its intellectual integrity.” 28 He stated that
“Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature
that simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated
notions of the law and economics movement.” 29 He concluded that a judicial
inquiry into director independence should not be limited to motives like
greed or avarice but should instead take into consideration the full “array of
other motivations . . . that influence human behavior such as love, friendship
and collegiality.” 30 In doing so, he acknowledged that Delaware law requires
courts to consider the independence of directors in the context of the facts
known to the court about each director specifically, the subjective “actual
person standard.” 31
Vice Chancellor Strine held that the Oracle special litigation committee
failed to satisfy the test for independence. The committee consisted of only
two members, both of whom were professors at Stanford University. The
derivative action was brought against another Stanford professor with
professional ties to one of the committee members, a Stanford alumnus who
had directed millions of dollars in contributions to Stanford and served on a
Stanford advisory board with one of the committee members, and Larry
Ellison, the CEO, who had donated millions of dollars to Stanford. 32 In
Oracle, Vice Chancellor Strine wrote:
It is no easy task to decide whether to accuse a fellow director of
insider trading. For Oracle to compound that difficulty by
requiring [special litigation committee] members to consider
accusing a fellow professor and two large benefactors of their
university of conduct that is rightly considered a violation of
criminal law was unnecessary and inconsistent with the concept of
independence recognized by our law. The possibility that these
extraneous considerations biased the inquiry of the [special
litigation committee] is too substantial for this court to ignore. 33

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 939.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 938.
Id.
Id. at 942 (quoting Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1167).
Id. at 920–21.
Id. at 921.
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In both Biondi and Oracle, Vice Chancellor Strine relied upon nonpecuniary considerations in finding a lack of independence and addressed
the effects that relationships, both social and professional, can have on
directors’ decision-making processes. 34 Vice Chancellor Strine concluded
that “by taking into account all circumstances, the Delaware approach
undoubtedly results in some level of indeterminacy, but with the
compensating benefit that independence determinations are tailored to the
precise situation at issue.” 35 The extent to which personal relationships and
other non-pecuniary considerations can compromise a director’s
independence is an important issue that he continued to develop in his future
opinions on the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court.
In MFW, Chancellor Strine reviewed the Delaware inquiry of director
independence in the context of a squeeze-out merger by a controller. 36 The
case involved a publicly traded company. More than half of the publicly
traded companies in the United States are incorporated in Delaware.37
Chancellor Strine noted:
[T]hat [stock exchange] rules governing director independence
were influenced by experience in Delaware and other states and
were the subject of intensive study by expert parties. They cover
many of the key factors that tend to bear on independence . . . and
they are a useful source for this court to consider when assessing
an argument that a director lacks independence. 38
He began his analysis by acknowledging that under Delaware law there is a
presumption that directors are independent, and the plaintiff bears the burden
of rebutting that presumption.
He recognized that mere allegations that directors are friendly with,
travel in the same social circles, or have past business relationships with the
proponent of a transaction or the person they are investigating are not enough
to rebut the presumption of independence. He noted that:
[I]f a friendship was one where the parties had served as each
other’s maids of honor, had been each other’s college roommates,
shared a beach house with their families each summer for a decade,
and are thick as blood relations, that context would be different
34. Paula J. Dalley, The Business Judgment Rule: What You Thought You Knew, 60
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 24, 28 (2006).
35. Oracle, 824 A. 2d 941.
36. In re MFW S’holder’s Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn v.
M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
37. Randy J. Holland, Delaware Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L.
771, 772 (2009).
38. MFW 67 A.3d at 510.
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from parties who occasionally had dinner over the years, go to
some of the same parties and gatherings annually, and call
themselves “friends.” 39
Instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate to the court that the director being
challenged has sufficient material ties to the person she is evaluating that she
cannot objectively fulfill her fiduciary duties. Chancellor Strine then applied
those precepts to the plaintiffs’ allegations and concluded that each of the
challenged directors was independent under Delaware’s well-established
jurisprudence. 40
CHIEF JUSTICE STRINE
In Sanchez, Chief Justice Strine wrote an opinion for a unanimous court
addressing whether the plaintiffs had pled particularized facts raising a
reasonable doubt about one of the Sanchez Public Company directors, Alan
Jackson. 41 The complaint challenged Jackson’s independence on two
grounds: first, that Chairman Sanchez and Jackson had been close friends for
more than five decades; and second, that Jackson’s personal wealth was
attributable to business interests over which Chairman Sanchez has
substantial influence. 42 The Court of Chancery concluded that the plaintiffs
had not pled sufficient facts to overcome the presumption that Jackson was
independent. 43
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sanchez by Chief Justice Strine
reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision for the reason that its
analysis seemed to consider the facts the plaintiffs pled about
Jackson’s personal friendship with Sanchez and the facts they pled
regarding his business relationships as entirely separate issues.
Having parsed them as categorically distinct, the Court of
Chancery appears to have concluded that neither category of facts
on its own was enough to compromise Jackson’s independence for
purposes of demand excusal. 44
Chief Justice Strine explained “the problem with that approach is that our
law requires that all the pled facts regarding a director’s relationship to the
interested party be considered in full context in making the admittedly

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 509 n.37.
Id. at 518.
Del. Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017 (Del. 2015).
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1021.
Id.
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imprecise, pleading state determination of independence.” 45 The Supreme
Court’s opinion in Sanchez concluded that the plaintiffs had pled
particularized facts that created a reasonable doubt about Jackson’s
independence. 46
In Sandy’s v Pincus, Chief Justice Strine wrote an opinion for a majority
of the Delaware Supreme Court. 47 The decision held that certain directors
were not independent because of personal and professional relationships
with the company’s controlling stockholder. 48 With regard to one director,
the opinion noted that co-ownership of an airplane was unusual and required
“close cooperation in use, which is suggestive of detailed planning indicative
of a continuing, close personal friendship.” 49 The opinion held that owning
an airplane with the interested party is indicative of “the type of very close
personal relationship that, like family ties, one would expect to heavily
influence a human’s ability to exercise impartial judgment.” 50
In Marchand, Chief Justice Strine’s opinion for a unanimous court
embraced his independent director analysis from Oracle: “when it comes to
life’s more intimate relationships concerning friendship and family, our law
cannot ‘ignore the social nature of humans’ or that they are motivated by
things other than money, such as ‘love, friendship, and collegiality’.” 51 The
Marchand opinion then applied the teachings of Sandy’s and Sanchez:
[A]lthough the fact that fellow directors are social acquaintances
who occasionally have dinner or go to common events does not,
in itself, raise a fair inference of non-independence, our law has
recognized that deep and long-standing friendships are meaningful
to human beings and then any realistic consideration of the
question of independence must give way to these important
relationships and their natural effect on the ability of the parties to
act in partially toward each other. 52
The Marchand opinion held that the important personal and business
relationship between Director Rankin and the Kruse family supported a
pleading stage inference that Rankin could not act independently. 53
In Cornerstone, Chief Justice Strine wrote an opinion answering the
question of whether “in an action for damages against corporate fiduciaries,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1024.
Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124 (Del. 2016).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 818 (Del. 2019).
Id. at 820.
Id.
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where the plaintive challenges an interested transaction that is presumptively
subject to entire fairness review, must the plaintive plead a non-exculpated
claim against the disinterested, independent directors to survive a motion to
dismiss by those directors?” 54 The opinion answered that question in the
affirmative. 55 The opinion pointed out that for more than a generation,
Delaware “law has recognized that the negotiating efforts of independent
directors can help to secure transactions with controlling stockholders that
are favorable to the minority.” 56
The Cornerstone opinion declined “to adopt an approach that would
create incentives for independent directors to avoid serving as special
committee members, or to reject transactions solely because their role in
negotiating on behalf of the stockholders will cause them to remain as
defendants until the end of any litigation challenging the transaction.” 57
Therefore, the Cornerstone opinion held that:
[A] plaintiff seeking only monetary damages must plead nonexculpated claims against a director who is protected by an
exculpatory charter provision to survive a motion to dismiss,
regardless of the underlying standard of review for the boards
conduct—be it Revlon, Unocal, the entire fairness standard, or the
business judgment rule. 58
In Cornerstone, the Delaware Supreme Court cited with approval
Chancellor Strine’s decision in Southern Peru. 59 In that case, after a trial,
the controller and its affiliated directors were held liable for damages
because the interested transaction at issue was not entirely fair to the minority
stockholders. 60 Nevertheless, the independent directors had been properly
dismissed on summary judgment by Chancellor Strine “because the plaintiff
had failed to present evidence supporting a non-exculpated breach of their
duty of loyalty.” 61

54. In re Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc. S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1175 (Del.
2015).
55. Id. at 1184.
56. Id. (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7).
57. Id.
58. Cornerstone, 115 A.3d at 1176 (footnotes omitted) (citing Revlon v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.1986); Unocal, 493 A.2d 946); see also Weinberger,
457 A.2d 701 (entire fairness standard); Aronson, 473 A.2d 805 (business judgement rule).
59. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 785 (Del. Ch.
2011).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 785.
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CONCLUSION
Determinations of director independence by Delaware courts continues
to evolve. Those judicial evaluations involve a contextual examination of
the materiality of the entire panoply of human relationships that may
compromise a person’s objectivity. In doing so, the courts frequently apply
the foundational first principles of director independence set forth in the
opinions of former Chief Justice Strine.

